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ABSTRACT 
Unexpected releases of toxic, reactive, or flammable liquids and gases in processes 
involving highly hazardous chemicals have been reported for many years in various 
industries that use chemicals with such properties. Regardless of the industry that uses 
these highly hazardous chemicals, there is a potential for an accidental release any time 
they are not properly controlled, creating the possibility of disaster. 
To help ensure safe and healthful workplaces, OSHA has issued the Process Safety 
Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals standard (29 CFR 1910.119), which 
contains requirements for the management of hazards associated with processes using 
highly hazardous chemicals. The objective of this project is to develop Process Safety 
Management Expert System (PSMES) (1). PSMES treats seven out of total of fourteen 
elements of Process Safety Management. PSMES is intended to serve as a tool to assist 
employers and employees in complying with the safety requirements. The tool is built 
using Visual Basic 2005 (Vb. net programming language). The project begin with the 
literature search on PSM. An expert system is software that attempts to provide an 
answer to a problem, or clarify uncertainties where normally one or more human experts 
would need to be consulted (2). This expert system will be a solution to the current 
Process Safety Management (PSM) weak point which its elements are treated separately, 
inconsistent, disintegrated and uncorrelated between one element to another. Early stage 
of the developing this tool starts with preparation of framework of each elements that are 
covered in scope of the project and to prepare all documents needed under each PSM 
elements to comply with OSHA requirements. The module is relevant to the current 
industry needs because it create a systematic approach to manage PSM in controlling 
the process hazards in the workplace especially in oil and gas industry like PETRONAS. 
The field test for this expert system is Natural Gas Dehydration Unit of Universiti 
Teknologi PETRONAS. This tool will be at its best fit for use, conformance to 
requirements and will able to satisfy the PSM implied needs. The expected outcome of 
this Process Safety Management Expert System (PSMES) is to replace the `paper based' 
conventional way in managing the PSM. 
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The modem civilization is totally dependent on the process industries whether they are OIL and 
Gas, Chemical (which of course includes the bio option), Pharmaceuticals and so on. By the very 
nature of these industries one often must deal will significant potential hazard such as fire and 
explosion, toxic release and many other similar situations. The process industries have by and 
large made a significant effort to mitigate these risks, however they still will exist because of the 
various materials and processes involved. There are many instances where disasters occurred 
because of poor design, unsafe operating conditions and errors in judgment (3). 
a. Flixborough The Flixborough works of Nypro produced caprolactam a monomer for 
nylon. One of the critical steps was the oxidation of cyclohexane to cyclohexanol in a 
series of six catalytic reactors in the presence of air. It was discovered that one of the 
reactors had a small crack resulting in an unplanned shutdown. This reactor was removed 
from service and a temporary pipe section was fabricated in the machine shop to replace 
the cracked reactor. Anecdotal evidence states that the pipe was designed with a piece of 
chalk on the floor of the maintenance shop. This temporary section was not adequately 
supported and upon pressurization it failed and released a large cloud of cyclohexane 
vapour. An unknown source of ignition caused this cloud to explode resulting in the 
death of 28 people and the injury of some 36 others. There was significant damage in the 
adjacent village (4). 
b. Bhopal. An insecticide plant in India suffered an accidental release of methyl isocyanate. 
This plant jointly owned by Union Carbide and local investors was essentially shut down 
at the time because of a labour dispute. Because the plant had been designed to receive 
shipments of MIC from another unit where it was produced there was a fairly large 
storage tank for the material. MIC will react slowly and exothermically with water and 
the MIC will boil if not adequately cooled. Somehow water was injected into this tank, 
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some believe it was sabotage by a disgruntled operator; however the result was that the 
tank boiled over. The vapours popped the pressure relief valve and under normal 
conditions would have been diverted safely into a scrubber and flare system. 
Unfortunately this equipment was out of service and an estimate of some 25 tons of 
extremely toxic vapour escaped, killing some 2,000 people living in the shanty village 
surrounding the plant and injuring some 20,000 others (5). 
c. Piper Alpha. Piper Alpha was an oil rig in the North Sea that was producing crude oil. It 
had been modified to handle natural gas as well. There were two large pumps both with 
relief valves on their discharge. One of these pumps had been taken off line because of a 
problem with the relief valve. The valve had been removed and a blind flange (a round 
sheet of steel) had been used to block off the line from this pump. Normal obligatory 
maintenance procedure requires that a ticket must be filed with the operating personnel. 
Unfortunately there was some mix-up and the ticket was never properly processed. Upon 
start up of the pump with the working relief valve it developed problems and the 
operating crew being unaware that the relief valve on the other pump had been replaced 
with a steel blind flange (the ticket had been misplaced or lost), shut down the pump and 
attempted to start up the other. The net effect of this was that the blind flange was unable 
to withstand the pressure and blew off the line discharging a cloud of natural gas, which 
ignited. This could have been dealt with as there was a water spray system that pumped 
seawater to several spray heads. Unfortunately there had been some maintenance work 
carried out near the intake to the water pumps and they were not available. Not to 
belabour the issue there were other unfortunate occurrences related to the fact that Piper 
Alpha was on a crude oil grid. The fire was soon out of control and so fierce that rescue 
craft were unable to approach the rig. A few of the men on the rig saved themselves by 
leaping several stories into the sea which at this point was covered with burning oil. The 
rest of the men perished in a structure that was supposed to be a safe haven but in fact 
became an oven. The rig was totally destroyed (6). 
Major accidents happened infrequently due to failure of Process Safety Management (PSM). Modern 
industrial society depends on the use of many potentially dangerous chemical substances. Occasionally 
major accidents occur during their processing or storage. Such accidents pose a health and safety hazard 
to workers and to the public, and can be an economic liability to the company and the community. 
Research suggests that companies may be unaware of what such accidents are costing, and of what are the 
root causes (7). 
Thus, the purpose of PSM is to prevent or minimize the consequences of catastrophic releases of 
toxic, flammable or explosive chemicals to the employee (OSHA) and to the public and 
environment (EPA). The development of Process Safety Management Expert System (PSMES) 
is in response to some of the recent process hazards that have occurred, and in ensuring that 
safety management is adequate thus to reflect the provisions of Process Safety. This tool will 
ensure the employee and the employers to asses the plant layout easily and improve the , 
maintainability, inspectability, and operability of the process safety. It is an application of 
management systems in a way in which process hazards are identified, understood, and 
controlled to prevent process related injuries and incidents. Management system is defined as 
policies, procedures, instructions and documentation used to manage the implementation of an 
activity within an organization. It is an Integrated system for managing one or more activities. 
PSMES is intended to serve as a tool to assist employers and employees in complying with the 
safety requirements, as well as provides other helpful recommendations and information in one. 
Using this tool, its user can quickly see the risk profile of the designed facility, particularly the 
high-risk items. 
Some activities associated with Process Safety Management (PSM) Expert System are: 
  Identifying elements that are covered in this project. 
  Reviewing the literature for application in the specific circumstances of the project. 
  Interpreting the elements to ensure they are consistently applied. 
" Communicating the elements and the interpretation to those tasked with applying them. 
  Updating the database of the PSM elements if they change. 
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Identifying who will benefit from integration and the target user: 
I. Employees who expect to be provided a safe workplace - these includes operators, 
maintenance workers and technical staff. 
2. Managers and employers who want easy-to-use and effective management systems that 
cover all PSM elements. 
3. UTP Laboratory Staff and Health, Safety and Environment Department. 
4. Contractors. 
5. Regulators/Auditors who expect compliance with all regulations and standards. 
OSHA clarification; Electronic storage or computerized storage of records and imformation 
required by this standard is permissible as long as it is readily accessible and easily understood 
(Preamble to 29 CFR 1910.119) (OSHA, 1995). 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
a. Current Process Safety management (PSM) application of management systems is in a 
way in which process hazards are identified, understood, and controlled to prevent 
process related injuries and incidents using PSM elements that treated separately, 
inconsistent, disintegrated and uncorrelated between one element to another. 
b. PSM elements are not easy to be accessed at the same time to manage safety, prolong the 
interaction time with external organizations and low system performance. Engineering 
Staff spent still a significant amount of time managing "paper-based" and unstructured 
Information. 
c. There is no software yet that covers all PSM elements. There are only several software 
products available that assists in making hazards analyses and risk assessments like 
designsafe for hazard analysis, "Design for Safety" Toolbox, SEMATECH FMEA 
Software Tool, FaultrEASE which only covers parts of elements. 
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d. The disintegrated PSM system fail to tackle the occurrence of a change in any 
components effectively that would affect safety at workplace. Changes of components 
that normally occur include those in process technology, facility, procedures and 
organizational structure. Any changes in these components need to be adequately 
controlled so that hazards could be adequately managed. Thus, by tacking this problem, 
the PSM implementation in the workplace will be more effective. 
e. There is no effective involvement of employees in the process safety management 
process because of the non existence of a specific Process Safety Management tool to 
assist them, their involvement engenders their alignment with corporate goals and values. 
Incomplete knowledge of the safety at workplace can be a source of hazard, to manage 
this risk, its require training prior to introduction of changes in process, technology 
and/or physical environment (8) 
f. PSM that is managed by not using a specific application tool results in difficulty in 
records keeping. The place where records are kept and for how long is not properly 
addressed together with the inadequate and hardly accessed information pertaining the 
person in charge for records maintenance. 
g. Engineering staff still spent a significant amount of time managing paper based work / 
safety related documents. 
1.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT 
1. To create and manage process safety. 
2. To develop a tool, Process Safety Management Expert System (PSMES) to integrate 
elements of PSM in one system using programming software, Visual Basic 2005. 
3. To organize the related information of PSM with ease. 
4. To help organization to comply with OSHA regulation. 
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1.3 SCOPE OF STUDY 
This project will cover seven elements of PSM out of total of fourteen elements. The whole PSM 
elements are as below. 
I. Employee Participation 
2. Process Safety Information (PSI) 
3. Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) 
4. Operating Procedures 
5. Training 
6. Contractors 
7. Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR) 
8. Mechanical Integrity 
9. Hot Work Permits 
10. Man agement of Change (MOC) 
1I. Incident Investigation 
12. Emergency Planning and Response 
13. Compliance Audits 
14. Trade Secrets 
And the scope of elements that are covered for this project was as listed below: 
1. Employee Participation 
2. Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) 
3. Trade Secrets 
4. Contractors 
5. Emergency Planning and Response 
6. Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR) 
7. Mechanical Integrity 
6 
1.4 PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS 
Before the frameworks are developed, it is important to understand the requirements of each 
PSM elements. Each PSM elements framework comply with its regulatory requirements as can 
be seen red in color in each framework flowchart shapes (refer Appendix A). Below is the 
summary of the PSM elements requirements that need to be included in each framework (9). 
a. Employee Participation-Requires developing a written plan of action regarding employee 
participation; consulting with employees and their representatives on the conduct and 
development of process hazard analyses and on the development of other elements of 
process safety management required under the rule; providing to employees and their 
representatives access to process hazard analyses and to all other information required to be 
developed under the rule. Employees include work site and contractor employees. Its 
regulatory requirements according to PSM standards are describe in the Table 1. 
Table 1: Employee Participation regulatory requirements 
Regulatory Requirements 
1 1910.119 ©(1) 
2 1910.119 ©2) 
3 1910.119 ©(3) 
b. Process Hazard Analysis-Specifies that process hazard analyses (FHA's) must be conducted 
as soon as possible for each covered process using compiled PS in an order based on a set of 
required considerations. At least twenty-five percent of initial process hazard analyses must 
be completed by May 26,1994; 50 percent by May 26,1995; 75 percent by May 26,1996; 
and 100 percent by May 26,1997. Process hazard analyses must be updated and revalidated 
at least every five years and must be retained for the life of the process. Its regulatory 
requirements according to PSM standards are describe in the Table 2. 
Table 2: Process Hazard Analysis regulatory requirements. 
Reg latory Requirements 
1 1910 119 (c) 3 1910.1 19 (c)(2) 
2 1910.119(c)(1) 4 1910.119 )(3) 
c. Trade Secrets-Sets requirements similar to trade secret provisions of the 1910.1200 Hazard 
Communication standard requiring information required by the PSM standard to be available 
to employees (and employees representatives). Employers may enter into confidentiality 
agreement with employees to prevent disclosure of trade secrets. Its regulatory requirements 
according to PSM standards are describe in the Table 3. 
Table 3: Trade Secrets regulatory requirement. 
Regulatory Requirements 
1 1910.119 (e)(1) 5 1910.119 (d)(4) (i)-(v) 
2 1910.119 (e)(1)(i)-(v) 6 1910.119 (d)(5) (i)-(v) 
3 1910.119 (d)(2) 7 1910.119 (d)(6) (i)-(v) 
4 1910.119 (d)(3) (i)-(v) 8 1910.119 )(7)(0- 
(v) 
d. Contractors-Idetifies responsibilities of work site employer and contract employers with 
respect to contract employees involved in maintenance, repair, turnaround, major renovation 
or specialty work, on or near covered processes. Contract employers are required to train 
their employees to safely perform their jobs, and document that employees received and 
understood training, and assure that contract employees know about potential process hazards 
and the work site employer's emergency action plan, assure that employees follow safety 
rules of the facility, and advise the work site employer of hazards contract work itself poses 
or hazards identified by contract employees. Its regulatory requirements according to PSM 
standards are describe in the Table 4. 





1 1910.119 (h)(i) 4 1910.119(h)(2) (iv) 
2 1910.119(h)(2) (ii) 5 1910.119(h)(2) (v) 
3 1910.119(h)(2) (iii) 6 1910.119(h)(2) (vi) 
Contract Employer Responsibilities 
1 1910.119 (h)( 1) 4 1910.119(h)(3) (iv) 
2 1910.119(h)(3) (ii) 5 1910.119(h)(3) (v) 
3 1910.119(h)(3) (iii) 6 1910.119(h)(3) (vi 
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e. Emergency Planning and Response-Requires employers to develop and implement an 
emergency action plan. The emergency action plan must include procedures for handling 
small releases. Its regulatory requirements according to PSM standards are describe in the 
Table 5. 
Table 5: Emergency Planning And Response regulatory requirement. 
Regulatory Requirements 
1 1910.119 (n) 
f. Pre-startup Safety Review-Mandates a safety review for new facilities and significantly 
modified work sites to confirm that the construction and equipment of a process are in 
accordance with design specifications; to assure that adequate safety, operating, maintenance 
and emergency procedures are in place; and to assure process operator training has been 
completed. Also, for new facilities, the PHA must be performed and recommendations 
resolved and implemented before start up. Modified facilities must meet management of 
change requirement. . 
Its regulatory requirements according to PSM standards are describe in 
the Table 6. 
Table 6: Pre-startup Safety review requirement. 
Re ulato Requirements 
1 1910.119 (1) 
2 1910.119 (i)(2)(i) 
3 1910.119 (i)(2)(ii) 
4 1910.119 (i)(2)(iii) 
5 1910.119 (i)(2)(iv) 
g. Mechanical Integrity-Requires the on-site employer to establish and implement written 
procedures for the ongoing integrity of process equipment particularly those components 
which contain and control a covered process. Its regulatory requirements according to PSM 
standards are describe in the Table 7. 
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Table 7: Mechanical Integrity regulatory requirement. 
Regulatory Requirements 
1 1910.119 0)(1) 7 1910.119(j)(4)(iv) 
2 1910.119 2 8 1910.119)5 
3 1910.119(j)(3) 9 1910.1190)(6)(1) 
4 1910.119 4i 10 1910 
. 
119 6 ii 





1. Process safety management (PSM) is addressed in specific standards for the general and 
construction industries. OSHA's standard emphasizes the management of hazards 
associated with highly hazardous chemicals and establishes a comprehensive 
management program that integrates technologies, procedures, and management 
practices. Process Safety Management (PSM) is the application of management systems 
in a way in which process hazards are identified, understood, and controlled to prevent 
process related injuries and incidents. Process Safety Management is a regulation, 
promulgated by the U. S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). A 
process is any activity or combination of activities including any use, storage, 
manufacturing, handling or the on-site movement of Highly Hazardous Chemicals 
(HHCs) as defined by OSHA and the Environmental Protection Agency. (10). 
2. OSHA Compliance. 
a. A process includes any group of vessels which are interconnected or separate and 
contain HHC's which could be involved in a potential release. A process safety 
incident is the "Unexpected release of toxic, reactive, or flammable liquids and gases 
in processes involving highly hazardous chemicals. Incidents continue to occur in 
various industries that use highly hazardous chemicals which exhibit toxic, reactive, 
flammable, or even explosive properties, or may exhibit a combination of these 
properties. Regardless of the industry that uses these highly hazardous chemicals, 
there is a potential for an accidental release any time they are not properly controlled. 
This, in turn, creates the possibility of disaster. To help assure safe and healthy 
workplaces, OSHA has issued the Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous 
Chemicals regulation (Title 29 of CFR Section 1910.119) which contains 
requirements for the management of hazards associated with processes using highly 
hazardous chemicals. " (11) 
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b. Any facility that stores or uses a defined "highly hazardous chemical" must comply 
with OSHA's Process Safety Management (PSM) regulations as well as the quite 
similar United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Risk Management 
Program (RMP) regulations (Title 40 CFR Part 68). The EPA has published a model 
RMP plan for an ammonia refrigeration facility131 which provides excellent guidance 
on how to comply with either OSHA's PSM regulations or the EPA's RMP 
regulations (12). 
3. An organization should really have only one safety management system - not a stack of them - 
and the PSM elements should be integrated into the existing organizational system. Once 
integrated, these components become components of the overall system, undifferentiated and 
totally congruent with the underlying principles of employee involvement, management 
leadership, process consistency, prevention, and continual improvement. These system will 
include common organizational elements for training, corrective and preventive actions, and 
communications, document control, recorded keeping, system audits, and periodic reviews. (13) 
4. At present, there is no integrated PSM elements implemented in the industry yet. For 
example, PETRONAS separated the 14 elements of PSM Elements into two groups 
which is under PETRONAS Technical Standard (PTS) and Health Safety and 
Environment Management System (HSE-MS) (14). 
PTS exist for these aspects. 
  Management of Change (MOC) 
  Mechanical Integrity (MI) 
  Process Safety Information (PSI) 
  Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
  Operating Procedures (OP) 
  Design Integrity (DI) 
  Proprietary and Licensed Technology Assessment (PLTA) 
  Pre-Activity Safety Review (PASR) 
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Other aspects within HSE-MS 
  Leadership 
  Training & Competency 
  Measurement & Review 
  Contractor Management & Procurement 
  Incident Investigation 
  Emergency Preparation 
  Non-routine Work Authorisation 
There are so many weakness in the implementation of the current safety management 
system. Some of the weaknesses includes as described in Current Challenges in Project 
Executions (15) are: 
a. Lacking of inoperability between Engineering Tools from different Software Vendors 
(e. g. PDMS, BOCAD, Intools) 
b. Data Inconsistency between Engineering Disciplines and their Deliverables 
c. Data and Document Change Management not efficient 
d. Engineering Staff spent still a significant amount of time managing "paper-based" 
and unstructured Information. 
6. Without an integrated PSM elements, it is taxing for the auditor that want to perform the 
auditing as the process audit begins with the identification of the work practices 
undertaken by business. There are two options for gathering this information. The first is 
to compile a list of outputs of each business unit/workplace and determine the processes 
involved in producing this output. The second option is to look at the position 
descriptions for each workplace to identify the tasks that are undertaken (16). Therefore, 
the data collection and documentation need to be perform prior to the audit process. 
However, data collection and documentation process is a time consuming "getting back 
to the process safety information gathering task, it should be pointed out there is no easy 
way to gather the required information; data collection and documentation process is a 
time-consuming, meticulous undertaking" (17). 
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7 The managements system need to cover all aspects of the work, throughout its complete 
lifecycle. Resources in this context includes the provision of suitably qualified staff and 
would include such issues as training. Auditing is used to ensure the various activities of 
the management system are implemented correctly. This is an ongoing activity that 
continuously strive s for improvement throughout a process of iteration. The overall 















8. The need for developing an integration framework - The framework for integration 
provides the skeleton on which the complete system will be built. The framework defines 
the overall structure of the integrated systems, the way they will be built and which tools 
will be used to build them. Correctly designed, the framework will ensure the integrated 
PSM systems will match other management systems in your organizations and meet the 
requirements of ISO 9000 or your Quality Corporate Management System (19). 
9. Software that can assists its user in handling the process safety management system can 
get certified by ISO 9000 TickIT. ISO 9000 TicklT is a certification system for quality 
management system specially designed to meet the needs of software industry. This gives 
detailed guidance on the implementation of ISO 9001 within the information technology 
area. The TickIT scheme makes certification of software companies' Quality 
Management Systems more credible than does ISO 9000 alone. But TicklT certification 
is still, nominally, to the ISO 9000 standard. TickIT applies to almost all software-related 
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activities, whether they involve product development, services or both. This includes 
software developed as part of some larger product, and in-house software developed 





There are some procedures to be followed in order to carry out and implement the project. This is 
to ensure that the project can be accomplished within the given timeframe. 
1. Literature search on the followings; 
i. PSM. 
ii. Available tool to manage PSM. 
2. Identify gaps based on the literature vs expectation. 
3. Develop framework for the PSM expert system. 
4. Detail-out the methodology for the PSM expert system. 
5. Develop the expert system based on the proposed framework. 
6. Check and balance of the tool developed with PETRONAS PSM experts. 
7. Field test the tool developed using selected PETRONAS plants. 
8. Analyze results and improvised the tool as necessary. 
9. Thesis write-up. 
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3.1 Tools 
3.1.1 Programming tools: Microsoft Visual Basic 2005 (VB. net) 
The programming tool is for software developing purposes. 
3.1.2 Database tools: Microsoft Access 2007 
The software to compile and to store database documents eg. MSDS PDF Files 
3.13 Microsoft Office 
Includes Microsoft Excel and Word. 
3.14 Adobe Acrobat 












Figure 2: System background 
.I1 
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a. PSMES is a program that manage the documents that is uploaded into public database (pub 
data) in a computer platform or of an organization and its end users as illustrated in Figure 2. 
It allows organizations to access and retrieved necessary Process Safety Management 
information using the PSMES application. 
b. Information of organ ization-wide PSM database is in the hands of database administrators. A 
PSM software package helps the use of integrated collection of data records and files known 
as databases. 
c. It allows different user application programs to easily access the same database. 
d. PSMES allows users and other software to store and retrieve data in a structured way. Instead 
of having to paper based documents to get and extract information, user can simple click on 
buttons and equipments. 




RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.0 System main framework 
System framework (Figure 3 )had been created prior the development of the tool using Visual 
Basic 2005, the system framework gives the clear picture on how the system works. The main 
features of the system frameworks are: 
a. User login and user validation form (Figure 4). There are 4 groups of user of this 
tool, and each group has different accessibility permission to the content of the 
database. 
1. System administrator - modify the tool as well as delete, add, and modify 
its content. 
II. Lecturer - read, delete, add, and modify the content. 
III. Minilab staff - read, add, and modify the content. 
IV. Anonymous user - can only read the content 
b. To categorized the PSM elements into two group, the quick menus at the main 
interface are provided to retrieve the elements which are not uniquely related to 
the process equipments or process node. These quick menus consists of the 
following; 
I. Employee Participation 
H. Contractor 
III. Emergency Response & Planning 
IV. Trade Secret 
While the PSM elements that uniquely related to the process equipment is 
embedded to that equipment itself which can be retrieve by clicking on that 
equipment. These elements are 
1. Mechanical Integrity 
H. Process Hazard Analysis 
III. Pre-Start Up Safety Review 
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4.01 System Framework 
Start 
Block Diagram 
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4.1 Natural Gas Dehydration Laboratory PFD 
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Figure 6: Natural Gas Dehydration Laboratory of Universiti Teknologi PETRONAS. 
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Figure 7: By System PFD 
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4.1.2 NG Dehydration Major Systems 
NG Dehydration Unit composed of 4 major systems which are: 
a. Humidification System : Pink Area (Figure 8) 
lgt. gmp '1K1009Y0ttM 
Figure 8: Humidification System 
b. Testing System : Blue Area (Figure 9) 
nsnresrrw 
ý 
Figure 9: Testing System 
c. Post Treatment System : Green Area (Figure 10) 
Figure 10: Post Treatment System 
d. Feed System : Purple Area (Figure 11) 
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4.2 NG Dehydration Laboratory by its major sytem (PSMES) 
There are three ways that the user can access to view the equipment PSM. Firstly is by the 
choosing the equipment in the pre-defined system (Figure 12). The other two ways will be 
described later in this chapter. 
Formt 





4.3 NG Dehydration Laboratory by its overall Process Flow Diagram 
Assuming the user has already know the sytem that they are looking for or its not necessary for 
them to allocate the node through the system, user can can simply choose their equipment that 
they want to retrieve their respective information by clicking directly that equipment on the 
Process Flow Diagram (Figure 13). 
Figure 13 : Each system has their own unique color so that user can easily choose their desired 
sytem. 
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4.4 NG Dehydration Laboratory Equipment List. 
User can also select the equipment from the equipment list to view its PSM elements (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14 : The equipment list. 
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4.5 PSM Elements Framework 
Framework for each elements are built as a basis flow chart of the software. 
1. Employee Participation (see Figure 15) 
2. Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) (See Figure 19) 
3. Trade Secrets (See Figure 26) 
4. Contractors (See Figure 28) 
5. Emergency Planning and Response (See Figure 30) 
6. Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR) (See Figure 32) 
7. Mechanical Integrity (See Figure 34) 
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4.5.1 a. Employee Participation Framework 
Update/View written action 
plan implementation of EP 
7930.119(c ! 1)] 
Consult with employee 




View Information related 




on EP/EP index 
ßack to PSM-BD 
elements 
Figure 15: Employee Participation Framework 
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4.5.1 b Employee Participation Screenshots. 
The main features of the Employee Participation window are: 
1. To view and update the team members of PHA, Incident Investigations, Safety Auditors 
and also Safety and Health Committee (Figure 16). 
II. To organize the employee participation action plan (Figure 17) 
III. To fill up and schedule the training needs assesstment (Figure 18). 
ýý Mrv: ý i-Y" 
Figure 16 : Employee Participation Window 
Figure 17 : Action plan 
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Figure 18 : Training Need Assestment. 
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11 10.119(eJ l(i) (v)u 
No Develop PHA 
[1910.119(e)(i)l 
" Update/View PHA team members (191O. 119(e)(4)(i)-(v)) 
" Update/Viewan established PHA system f t4! :. 
" Update/View PHA result covering: 
-Process Hazards [1910.119 (e) (3) (i) J 
-Identification of Previous Incident [1910.119(e) (3) (ii) J 





-Facility Siting Issue [1910.119(e)(3)(v)] 
-Human Factor Issue [141ß. 114(e[[3)(vi;; 
-Qualitative evaluation of the 
HSE effect 11910.1 19 (e) (3) (v l! ) J 
" Update/View retention life of PHA process I 19a. 119(o)(7)1 
Back to PSM-PFD 
elements 
Figure 19: PHA Framework 
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Revalidate PHA every 5 
years !L 10,119! e)(6)J 
4.5.2 b. Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) screenshots 
These screenshots provides the illustration to retrieves the Process Hazards Analysis of the 
Compressor V470. User need to find the location of the Compressor V470 by scrolling 
horizontally and vertically in the Process Flow Diagram (PFD) canvas (Figure 20). 
0 
Figure 20 : Location of compressor V470 in the Process Flow Diagram (PFD). 
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Once the Compressor V470 is clicked. The compressor window will appear on the screen. This 
window provides the equipment overview, general safety remark, the equipment Diagram and a 
set of buttons to retrieve the information on 
a. Process Hazard analysis 
b. Process Safety Information 
c. Mechanical Integrity 
d. Operating Procedures 
e. Pre-Start Up Safety Review 
f. Management of Change. 
In addition, the user can view the equipment mechanical design , parts and components and parts list (Figure 21). 
Figure 21 : Compressor V470 in the Process Flow Diagram window. 
mi 
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Next, when the PHA button is clicked, the PHA window will appear. On that window, user can 
view and update the PHA team members and HAZOP Table as well as viewing or scheduling the 
HAZOP Meeting (Figure 22,23,24 and 25). 
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Figure 22 : PHA Window showing the team members. 
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Figure 23 : PHA Window showing the constructed HAZOP Table. 
Figure 24 : HAZOP Guideline to 
construct HAZOP Table.. 
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0 
Figure 25: HAZOP Risk Matrix 
4.5.3 a. Trade Secrets Framework 
" Update/view all trade secret information necessary to comply with the 
PSM requirement to the person: - [1910.119 (p) (1)] 
-Responsible for compiling the PSI 
-Assisting in the development of the PHA 
-Responsible for developing the OP 
-Involved in incident investigations 
-Involved in emergency planning and response 
-Involved in compliance audits 
" Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude the employer from requiring the 
persons to whom the information is made available under paragraph (p)(1) 
of this section to enter into confidentiality agreements not to disclose the 
information. [1910.119(p)(7_)] 
Update/view only for employees and their designated representatives that have access to 
trade secret information contained within the process hazard analysis and other 
documents required to be developed by this standard. [ 19: a. i1P!;: ; ;'j 
Return to I'SM- 
BD elements 
Figure 26: Trade Secrets Frameworks 
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4.5.3 b. Trade Secrets Screenshots 
The Trade Secrets of the process, design of instrument, pattern, or information can be accessed 
only by authorized personnel. When the button of Trade Secrets in the Quick Menu is clicked, 
the PSMES prompt its user to enter validation id so that the "confidential information" or 
"classified information" are well protected (Figure 27). The PSMES also prompts its user to 
validate their authority over the trade secrets when the user clicked on the equipment on the PFD 
that is classified as Trade Secret. 
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Figure 27 : Trade Secret Login 





4.5.4 a. Contractors Framework 
From PSM-BD 
elements 
Update/view contractor involved in performing 
maintenance, turnaround, major renovation, or specialty 
work or adjacent to covered process. Not apply to 
contractors that not influence safety. [ i91o. i i 91, t-y;: lj 
Employer 
Update/view employer responsibilities regarding: - 
- Selecting a contractor, obtain and evaluate information 
regarding the contract employer's safety performance and 
programs (1910.119(h](2)(i)J 
- Inform contractor of known potential fire, toxic release 
hazards (1910.119(h)(2)(ii)] 
Explain contractors the emergency action plan required 
J191o. 129(h)ý2J; tý )1 
Develop and implement safe work practices, to control 
the entrance, presence and exit of contractors in covered 
process areas. (1910.119(hl(2)(iv)J 
- Periodically evaluate the performance of contract 
employers in fulfilling their obligations 119 10,1191 h)i 2)(v) I 
- Maintain a contract employee injury and illness log 
related to the contractor's work in process areas. 
11910.119Cýý)12)ý, 1) 
Back to PSM-BD 
elcments 
T 
Update/view contractors responsibilities regarding: - 
- Assuring that each contractor is trained in the work 
practices necessary to safely perform jobs 
[1913. -: 9;. h if 3ý! )i 
- Assuring each contractors is instructed in the known 
potential fire, explosion, or toxic release hazards related to 
job and the process, and the applicable provisions of the 
emergency action plan. [ 1910. ll9(h)(31(ý: )) 
- Documenting each contractor has received and 
understood the training required. The contractor shall 
prepare a record which contains the identity of the 
employee, the date of training, and the means used to 
verify that the employee understood the training. 
[ 1910.119,!, 1(3)(H il)) 
- Assuring that contractor follows the safety rules of the 
facility including the safe work practices required. 
[ 1910.119(h I(3)( ") J 
advise the employer of any unique hazards presented by 
the contractor's work, or of any hazards found by the 
contractor's work[_s_ý. i19ý )(3((v; 
Figure 28: Contractors Framework 
Contractor 
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4.5.4 b. Contractors Screenshots 
The Contractor windows will appear once the Contactor button in the Quick Menu is clicked. In 
the Contractor window, user can retrieve information regarding the contractor as well as key-in 
necessary contractor information (Figure 29). This window provides the information regarding 
the following subject: 
1. Contractor List 
U. Safe Work Practise 
111. Safety Program Overview 
IV. Potential Hazard 
V. Employee injury and illness log. 
VI. Emergency Response Planning. 
_... -.:. f9: 
iafs:. ý. Faa» 
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,: ý.,, , ýýýýýý ý. ý ,ý 
Figure 29 : Contractor's window. 
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4.5.5 a. Emergency Planning and Response (ERP) Framework 
r From PSM-13D 
elements 
No 
Update/view emergency planning and response system implementation of 
emergency action plan for the entire plant in accordance with the provisions 
of the local authority e. g 29 CFR 1910.38. It shall include: - L9 ] o. i, 
-Procedures for handling small releases. 
-Employers covered under this standard may also be subject to the 
hazardous waste and emergency response provisions contained in 29 CFR 
1910.120 (a), (p) and (q). 
C 
Back to PSM-BD" 
clcnu: nts 
Figure 30: ERP Framework 
Develop ERP system 
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4.5.5 b. Emergency Planning and Response Screenshots 
The Emerrgency Response and Planning window will appear once the Emergency Planning 
button in the Quick Menu is clicked. In the Window, emergency procedures related to small 
release, explosion and fire can be viewed. (Figure 31) 
The other features are user can display the emergency exit in case of emergency and it also 
provides the link to the training to view necessary training required for the emergency response 
and planning. 
ý13.. r-. -. -. 
Figure 31: Emergency Response and Plannig Window. 
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4.5.6 a. Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR) Framework 
Update/view Pre Startup Safety Review involved in [ 191 o. 119(i)(1)] 
-New Facility 
-Modified facilities when the modification is significant enough to 
require a change in PSI 
Update/View the PSSR shall confirm that prior to the introduction 
of highly hazardous chemicals to a process: 
-Construction and equipment is in accordance with design 
specification 11910.119(i)(2)(i)] 
-Safety operating maintenance and emergency procedure are in 
place and adequate [1910.119(i)(2)(ii)] 
-For new facilities, a PHA has been performed and 
recommendations have been resolved or implemented before 
start up; and modified facilities meet the requirements contained 
in MOC, paragraph (I) (1910.119(i)(2)(iii)] 
- Training of each employee involved in operating a process has 
been completed [1910.119(i)(2)(iv)] 
Back to PSM-PFD 
elements 
Figure 32: PSSR Framework 
PSSR FRAMEWORK 
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4.5.6 b. Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR) Screenshots 
User can review the safety for new facilities and significantly modified work sites to confirm that 
the construction and equipment of a process are in accordance with design specifications. 
I. To view the PSSR of the equipment, user need to click on the desired system or 
equipment. Once the button is clicked, the equipment window will appear. 
II. From the equipment window, user can click on PSSR. In the PSSR window, the PSSR 
review will be displayed (Figure 33). 
III. User can choose to view the PSSR of the new facility and also the modified facility. 
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Figure 33 : PSSR Window. 
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4.5.7 a. Mechanical Integrity (MI) Framework 
Update/view section that apply to following process equipment: - 
-Pressure vessel and storage tanks [I t, i, 
-Piping system and components ', '?. f. 
-Relieve and vent systems and devices i! I 
-Emergency shutdown systems , ýIl 
-Control (monitoring devices, alarms and interlocks) I! 
-Pumps119'1C... 
No 
Update/view training for process maintenance involved in 
maintaining on-going integrity of process equipment: - 
-An overview of process and 
hazards 
-Procedure applicable to employee job tasks 
} 
Develop written procedure to maintain 
on-going integrity of process equipment 
Update/view inspection and testing involved in Ml: - 
-Performed on process equipment I i, i 
-Follow the recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices 
-Frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable 
manufacturers' recommendations and good engineering practices, and more frequently if determined to be 
necessary by prior operating experience. [ 19Uu,. 1 : 
-Document each inspection and test that has been performed on process equipment: -! 
-date of the inspection or test, 
-name of the person who performed the inspection or test, 
-serial number or other identifier of the equipment on which the inspection or test was performed, 
-description of the inspection or test performed, 
-results of the inspection or test. 
4 
Update/view documents deficiencies: - icii 
-Correct deficiencies in equipment that outside acceptable limit 
before further use 
-In a safe timely manner when necessary means are taken to assure 
safe operation 
-Acceptable limit define by the PSI 
4 
Update/view quality assurance: - 
-construction of new plants and equipment, the employer shall assure that 
equipment as it is fabricated is suitable for the process application for which 
they will be used. [ 1410.1, ý?; i) 
-Appropriate checks and inspections shall be performed to assure that 
equipment is installed properly and consistent with design specifications and 
the manufacturer's instructions. [, 
-assure that maintenance materials, spare parts and equipment are suitable 
for the process application for which they will be used. I, i 
Rack to PSM-PF'D 
elements 
45 
Figure 34: MI Framework 
4.5.7 b. Mechanical Integrity (Ml) Screenshots 
Mechanical integrity means the process of ensuring that process equipment is fabricated from the 
proper materials of construction and is properly installed, maintained, and replaced to prevent 
failures and accidental releases. 
I. To view the MI of the equipment, user need to click on the desired system or equipment. 
Once the button is clicked, the equipment window will appear (Figure 35). 
II. From the equipment window, user can click on the MI button to view the MI window. 
Ill. MI window provides the user with the following 
 A set of link to the Procedures, Training, and Maintenance 
  Record of inspection and Testing 
  Equipment deficiencies report 
  Internal Standards of Facility as well as codes and standards published by NFPA, 
ASTM and ANSI. 
"ý_ý Nw. hn. ticx ý'zM"! 
i". 






_.. .ý". Y:. "X. 2! . _.. rY.... 
G 
i r::: ýW L '. . Ilf 
i. 4+s3': ' s[ý"y ý 





5.0 PSMES Economic Potential 
The Process Safety Management Expert System (PSMES) has high potential to be 
commercialized in the outside market. The reason is that it can be the ultimate tool for the 
companies to manage Process Safety, to prevents hazards and to comply with OSHA 
requirements. It is also contributes in minimizing the management and maintenance cost thus 
saving time. 
5.1 PSMES Features 
The PSMES has high economic potential based on these criteria: 
a. Strategic software design - the software is designed to match with industrials 
needs which is to prevents hazard and to comply with OSHA regulations. 
b. The tool is a platform to retrieve information in such easer way and can eliminate 
the need of paper based documentation. For example HAZOP, PSMES gives 
speedy access to material useful to the study team, such as previously identified 
problems, failure rate data and other such historical information. 
c. It is user friendly, its provide a comprehensive and easy to use system for 
effective action follow-up and close-out, without the significant administrative 
burden that this usually entails. 
d. It's the only software that integrate seven PSM elements in a single system. 
e. It is a stand-alone and network license configurations 
f. Easy-to-read Microsoft Excel-type Worksheet and PDF files. 
g. Graphical user interface 
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5.2 Introduction ofPSMES Software Industry 
Software industry has high potential and promises high return, according to market researcher 
DataMonitor, the size of the worldwide software industry in 2008 was US$ 303.8 billion, an 
increase of 6.5% compared to 2007. Americas account for 42.6% of the global software market's 
value. DataMonitor forecasts that in 2013, the global software market will have a value of US$ 
457 billion, an increase of 50.5% since 2008. Thus there is a huge opportunity of the PSMES 
marketability in the software industry (21). 
5.3 Market Overview of PSMES 
Malaysia's software market revenues are expected to dip to US$709mn in 2009, down slightly 




It can be concluded that the development of Process Safety Management Expert System 
(PSMES) can manage the Process Safety Management (PSM) more effective than the 
conventional way. The objective of this project that is intended to serve as a tool to assist 
employers and employees in complying with the safety requirements is achieved. This expert 
system will be a solution to the current Process Safety Management (PSM) weak point which its 
elements are treated separately, inconsistent, disintegrated and uncorrelated between one element 
to another. In the future, the system can be expanded and continued to integrate all elements in 
PSM. 
. 
This tool will be at its best fit for use, conformance to requirements and will able to 
satisfy the PSM implied needs. The expected outcome of this Process Safety Management Expert 
System (PSMES) is to replace the `paper based' conventional way in managing the PSM. 
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APPENDIX A 
Process Safety Management (PSM) Standards 
Process safety management (PSM) is addressed in specific standards for the general and 
construction industries. OSHA's standard emphasizes the management of hazards associated with 
highly hazardous chemicals and establishes a comprehensive management program that 
integrates technologies, procedures, and management practices. This page highlights OSHA 
standards, preambles to final rules (background to final rules), directives (instructions for 
compliance officers), standard interpretations (official letters of interpretation of the standards), 
other federal standards, and national consensus standards related to PSM. 
OSHA 
Section 5(a)(1) of the OSH Act, often referred to as the General Duty Clause, requires employers 
to "furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from 
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his 
employees". Section 5(a)(2) requires employers to "comply with occupational safety and health 
standards promulgated under this Act". 
Note: Twenty-four states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have OSHA- 
approved State Plans and have adopted their own standards and enforcement 
policies. For the most part, these States adopt standards that are identical to 
Federal OSHA. However, some States have adopted different standards applicable 
to this topic or may have different enforcement policies. 
Highlighted Standards 
General Industry (29 CFR 1910) 
" 1910 Subpart H, Hazardous materials 
o 1910.119, Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals 
" Appendix A, List of highly hazardous chemicals, toxics and reactives 
(Mandatory) 
" Appendix B, Block flow diagram and simplified process flow diagram 
(Nonmandatory) 
" Appendix C, Compliance guidelines and recommendations for process 
safety management (Nonmandatory) 
  Appendix D, Sources of further information (Nonmandatory) 
Construction Industry (29 CFR 1926) 
" 1926 Subpart D, Occupational health and environmental controls 
o 1926.64, Process safety management of highly hazardous chemicals 
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  Appendix A, List of highly hazardous chemicals, toxics and reactives 
(Mandatory) 
  Appendix B, Block flow diagram and simplified process flow diagram 
(Nonmandatory) 
  Appendix C, Compliance guidelines and recommendations for process 
safety management (Nonmandatory) 
  Appendix D, Sources of further information (Nonmandatory) 
Preambles to Final Rules 
" Process Safety Management (1992) 
" Search all available preambles to final rules. 
Directives 
" Petroleum Refinery Process Safety Management National Emphasis Program. [CPL 03- 
00-010], (2009, August 18). Also available as a 363 KB PDF, 111 pages. 
" PSM Covered Chemical Facilities National Emphasis Program. 09-06 (CPL 02), (2009, 
July 27). Also available as a 125 KB PDF, 30 pages. 
" Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals -- Compliance Guidelines 
and Enforcement Procedures. CPL 02-02-045 [CPL 2-2.45A], (1992, September 28). 
(Note: Some original CPL and audit guidelines are not included in this document). 
" OSHA Response to Significant Events of Potentially Catastrophic Consequences. CPL 
02-00-094 [CPL 2.94], (1991, July 22). 
" Search all available directives. 
Standard Interpretations 
" Clarification of the retail facilities exemption under the PSM standard. (2005, December 
12). 
" Use of ANSiISA S84.00.01-2004 Parts 1-3 (IEC 61511 MOD) to comply with OSHA's 
Process Safety Management standard. (2005, November 29). 
" Search all available standard interpretations. 
Other Federal 
Note: These are NOT OSHA regulations. However, they do provide guidance from their 
originating organizations related to worker protection. 
US Department of Defense 
" 5154.4S, Ammunition & Explosives Safety Standards 
" 4145.26M, Contractor's Safety Manual for Ammunition, Explosives and Related 
Dangerous Material 
National Consensus 
Note: These are NOT OSHA regulations. However, they do provide guidance from their 
originating organizations related to worker protection. 
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American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/American Petroleum Institute (API) 
" 2015-1994, Safe Entry and Cleaning of Petroleum Storage Tanks, Planning and 
Managing Tank Entry from Decommissioning Through Recommissioning, Fifth Edition 
" 500-1992, Classification of Locations for Electrical Installations at Petroleum Facilities, 
First Edition 
" 510-1992, Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: Maintenance Inspection, Rating, Repair, and 
Alteration, Seventh Edition. Includes Supplement I and Supplement 2. 
American Petroleum Institute (API) 
" 598, Valve Inspection and Testing, Seventh Edition 
" 653, Tank Inspection, Repair, Alteration, and Reconstruction, Second Edition. Includes 
Addendum 1. 
" API Recommended Practices 
o RP 574-1992, Inspection of Pressure Relieving Devices, First Edition 
o RP 520-1-1992, Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices 
in Refineries Part I, "Sizing and Selection, " Sixth Edition 
o RP 752, Management of Hazards Associated With Location of Process Plant 
Buildings, CMA Manager's Guide, First Edition 
o RP 2003, Protection Against Ignitions Arising Out of Static, Lightning, and Stray 
Currents, Fifth Edition 
o RP 574-1992, Inspection of Piping, Tubing, Valves, and Fittings, First Edition 
o RP 55, Conducting Oil and Gas Producing and Gas Processing Plant Operations 
Involving Hydrogen Sulfide, Second Edition 
o RP 2220, Improving Owner and Contractor Safety Performance, First Edition 
o RP 750, Management of Process Hazards, First Edition 
o RP 521-1992, Guide for Pressure-Relieving and Depressuring Systems, Third 
Edition 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 
The NFPA mission is to reduce the worldwide burden of fire and other hazards on the quality of 
life by providing and advocating scientifically-based consensus codes and standards, research, 
training, and education. 
" 495, Explosive Materials Code. Covers the manufacture, transportation, storage, sale, and 
use of explosive materials. 
" 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity 
" 780, Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems 
Regulations (Standards - 29 CFR) - Table of Contents Regulations (Standards 
- 29 CFR) - Table of Contents 
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Process safety management of highly hazardous 
chemicals. 




This section applies to the following: 
1910.119(a)(1)(i) 
A process which involves a chemical at or above the specified threshold quantities listed in 
Appendix A to this section; 
1910.119(a)(1)(ii) 
A process which involves a flammable liquid or gas (as defined in 1910.1200(c) of this part) on 
site in one location, in a quantity of 10,000 pounds (4535.9 kg) or more except for: 
1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(A) 
Hydrocarbon fuels used solely for workplace consumption as a fuel (e. g., propane used for 
comfort heating, gasoline for vehicle refueling), if such fuels are not a part of a process 
containing another highly hazardous chemical covered by this standard; 
1910.119(a)(1)(ii)(B) 
Flammable liquids stored in atmospheric tanks or transferred which are kept below their normal 
boiling point without benefit of chilling or refrigeration. 
1910.119(a)(2) 






Oil or gas well drilling or servicing operations; or, 
1910.119(a)(2)(iii) 
Normally unoccupied remote facilities. 
1910.119(b) 
Definitions. 
"Atmospheric tank" means a storage tank which has been designed to operate at pressures from 
atmospheric through 0.5 p. s. i. g. (pounds per square inch gauge, 3.45 Kpa). 
"Boiling point" means the boiling point of a liquid at a pressure of 14.7 pounds per square inch 
absolute (p. s. i. a. ) (760 mm. ). For the purposes of this section, where an accurate boiling point is 
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unavailable for the material in question, or for mixtures which do not have a constant boiling 
point, the 10 percent point of a distillation performed in accordance with the Standard Method of 
Test for Distillation of Petroleum Products, ASTM D-86-62, which is incorporated by reference 
as specified in Sec. 1910.6, may be used as the boiling point of the liquid. 
"Catastrophic release" means a major uncontrolled emission, fire, or explosion, involving one or 
more highly hazardous chemicals, that presents serious danger to employees in the workplace. 
"Facility" means the buildings, containers or equipment which contain a process. 
"Highly hazardous chemical" means a substance possessing toxic, reactive, flammable, or 
explosive properties and specified by paragraph (a)(1) of this section. 
"Hot work" means work involving electric or gas welding, cutting, brazing, or similar flame or 
spark-producing operations. 
"Normally unoccupied remote facility" means a facility which is operated, maintained or 
serviced by employees who visit the facility only periodically to check its operation and to 
perform necessary operating or maintenance tasks. No employees are permanently stationed at 
the facility. Facilities meeting this definition are not contiguous with, and must be geographically 
remote from all other buildings, processes or persons. 
"Process" means any activity involving a highly hazardous chemical including any use, storage, 
manufacturing, handling, or the on-site movement of such chemicals, or combination of these 
activities. For purposes of this definition, any group of vessels which are interconnected and 
separate vessels which are located such that a highly hazardous chemical could be involved in a 
potential release shall be considered a single process. 
"Replacement in kind" means a replacement which satisfies the design specification. 
"Trade secret" means any confidential formula, pattern, process, device, information or 
compilation of information that is used in an employer's business, and that gives the employer an 
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. Appendix D 




Employers shall develop a written plan of action regarding the implementation of the employee 
participation required by this paragraph. 
1910.119(c)(2) 
Employers shall consult with employees and their representatives on the conduct and 
development of process hazards analyses and on the development of the other elements of 
process safety management in this standard. 
1910.119(c)(3) 
Employers shall provide to employees and their representatives access to process hazard analyses 




Process hazard analysis. 
1910.119(e)(1) 
The employer shall perform an initial process hazard analysis (hazard evaluation) on processes 
covered by this standard. The process hazard analysis shall be appropriate to the complexity of 
the process and shall identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the process. 
Employers shall determine and document the priority order for conducting process hazard 
analyses based on a rationale which includes such considerations as extent of the process 
hazards, number of potentially affected employees, age of the process, and operating history of 
the process. The process hazard analysis shall be conducted as soon as possible, but not later than 
the following schedule: 
1910.119(e)(I)(i) 
No less than 25 percent of the initial process hazards analyses shall be completed by May 26, 
1994; 
1910.119(e)(1)(ii) 
No less than 50 percent of the initial process hazards analyses shall be completed by May 26, 
1995; 
1910.119(e)(1)(iii) 
No less than 75 percent of the initial process hazards analyses shall be completed by May 26, 
1996; 
1910.119(e)(1)(iy) 
All initial process hazards analyses shall be completed by May 26,1997. 
1910.119(e)(1)(v) 
Process hazards analyses completed after May 26,1987 which meet the requirements of this 
paragraph are acceptable as initial process hazards analyses. These process hazard analyses shall 
be updated and revalidated, based on their completion date, in accordance with paragraph (e)(6) 
of this standard. 
1910.119(e)(2) 
The employer shall use one or more of the following methodologies that are appropriate to 
determine and evaluate the hazards of the process being analyzed. 
1910.119(e)(2)(i) 
What-If; 





Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP); 
1910.119(e)(2)(v) 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA); 
1910.119(e)(2)(vi) 
Fault Tree Analysis; or 
1910.119(e)(2)(vii) 
An appropriate equivalent methodology. 
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1910.119(e)(3) 
The process hazard analysis shall address: 
1910.119(e)(3)(i) 
The hazards of the process; 
1910.119(e)(3)(ii) 
The identification of any previous incident which had a likely potential for catastrophic 
consequences in the workplace; 
1910.119(e)(3)(iii) 
Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships 
such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases. 
(Acceptable detection methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation 
with alarms, and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors. ); 
.. 1910.119(e) (3) (iv) 
1910.1 l9(e)(3)(iv) 




Human factors; and 
1910.119(e)(3)(vii) 
A qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects of failure of controls 
on employees in the workplace. 
1910.119(e)(4) 
The process hazard analysis shall be performed by a team with expertise in engineering and 
process operations, and the team shall include at least one employee who has experience and 
knowledge specific to the process being evaluated. Also, one member of the team must be 
knowledgeable in the specific process hazard analysis methodology being used. 
1910.119(e)(5) 
The employer shall establish a system to promptly address the team's findings and 
recommendations; assure that the recommendations are resolved in a timely manner and that the 
resolution is documented; document what actions are to be taken; complete actions as soon as 
possible; develop a written schedule of when these actions are to be completed; communicate the 
actions to operating, maintenance and other employees whose work assignments are in the 
process and who may be affected by the recommendations or actions. 
.. 1910.119(e) (6) 1910.119(e)(6) 
At least every five (5) years after the completion of the initial process hazard analysis, the 
process hazard analysis shall be updated and revalidated by a team meeting the requirements in 
paragraph (e)(4) of this section, to assure that the process hazard analysis is consistent with the 
current process. 
1910.119(e)(7) 
Employers shall retain process hazards analyses and updates or revalidations for each process 
covered by this section, as well as the documented resolution of recommendations described in 





Application. This paragraph applies to contractors performing maintenance or repair, turnaround, 
major renovation, or specialty work on or adjacent to a covered process. It does not apply to 
contractors providing incidental services which do not influence process safety, such as janitorial 




The employer, when selecting a contractor, shall obtain and evaluate information regarding the 
contract employer's safety performance and programs. 
1910.119(h)(2)(ii) 
The employer shall inform contract employers of the known potential fire, explosion, or toxic 
release hazards related to the contractor's work and the process. 
1910.119(h)(2)(iii) 
The employer shall explain to contract employers the applicable provisions of the emergency 
action plan required by paragraph (n) of this section. 
.. 1910.119(h)(2)(iv) 1910.119(h)(2)(iv) 
The employer shall develop and implement safe work practices consistent with paragraph (f)(4) 
of this section, to control the entrance, presence and exit of contract employers and contract 
employees in covered process areas. 
1910.119(h)(2)(v) 
The employer shall periodically evaluate the performance of contract employers in fulfilling their 
obligations as specified in paragraph (h)(3) of this section. 
1910.119(h)(2)(vi) 
The employer shall maintain a contract employee injury and illness log related to the contractor's 
work in process areas. 
1910.119(h)(3) 
Contract employer responsibilities. 
1910.119(h)(3)(i) 
The contract employer shall assure that each contract employee is trained in the work practices 
necessary to safely perform his/her job. 
1910.119(h)(3)(ii) 
The contract employer shall assure that each contract employee is instructed in the known 
potential fire, explosion, or toxic release hazards related to his/her job and the process, and the 
applicable provisions of the emergency action plan. 
1910.119(h)(3)(iii) 
The contract employer shall document that each contract employee has received and understood 
the training required by this paragraph. The contract employer shall prepare a record which 
contains the identity of the contract employee, the date of training, and the means used to verify 
that the employee understood the training. 
.. 1910.119(h) (3) (i v) 1910.119(h)(3)(iv) 
The contract employer shall assure that each contract employee follows the safety rules of the 
facility including the safe work practices required by paragraph (f)(4) of this section. 
1910.119(h)(3)(v) 
59 
The contract employer shall advise the employer of any unique hazards presented by the contract 
employer's work, or of any hazards found by the contract employer's work. 
1910.119(i) 
Pre-startup safety review. 
1910.119(i)(1) 
The employer shall perform a pre-startup safety review for new facilities and for modified 
facilities when the modification is significant enough to require a change in the process safety 
information. 
1910.119(i)(2) 
The pre-startup safety review shall confirm that prior to the introduction of highly hazardous 
chemicals to a process: 
1910.119(i)(2)(i) 
Construction and equipment is in accordance with design specifications; 
1910.119(i)(2)(ii) 
Safety, operating, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place and are adequate; 
1910.119(i)(2)(iii) 
For new facilities, a process hazard analysis has been performed and recommendations have 
been resolved or implemented before startup; and modified facilities meet the requirements 
contained in management of change, paragraph (1). 
.. 1910.119(1) (2) (i v) 1910.119(i)(2)(iv) 




Application. Paragraphs (j)(2) through (j)(6) of this section apply to the following process 
equipment: 
1910.119(j)(1)(i) 
Pressure vessels and storage tanks; 
1910.119(*)(1)(ii) 
Piping systems (including piping components such as valves); 
1910.119(j)(1)(iii) 
Relief and vent systems and devices; 
1910.119(6)(1 )(iv) 
Emergency shutdown systems; 
1910.119(j)(1)(v) 




Written procedures. The employer shall establish and implement written procedures to maintain 
the on-going integrity of process equipment. 
.. 1910.119(1)(3) 1910.119(1)(3) 
Training for process maintenance activities. The employer shall train each employee involved in 
maintaining the on-going integrity of process equipment in an overview of that process and its 
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hazards and in the procedures applicable to the employee's job tasks to assure that the employee 
can perform the job tasks in a safe manner. 
1910.119(1)(4) 
Inspection and testing. 
1910.119(i)(4)(i) 
Inspections and tests shall be performed on process equipment. 
1910.119(j)(4)(ii) 
Inspection and testing procedures shall follow recognized and generally accepted good 
engineering practices. 
1910.119(j)(4)(iii) 
The frequency of inspections and tests of process equipment shall be consistent with applicable 
manufacturers' recommendations and good engineering practices, and more frequently if 
determined to be necessary by prior operating experience. 
1910.119(i)(4)(iv) 
The employer shall document each inspection and test that has been performed on process 
equipment. The documentation shall identify the date of the inspection or test, the name of the 
person who performed the inspection or test, the serial number or other identifier of the 
equipment on which the inspection or test was performed, a description of the inspection or test 
performed, and the results of the inspection or test. 
.. 1910.119(j) (5) 
1910.119(i)(5) 
Equipment deficiencies. The employer shall correct deficiencies in equipment that are outside 
acceptable limits (defined by the process safety information in paragraph (d) of this section) 





In the construction of new plants and equipment, the employer shall assure that equipment as it is 
fabricated is suitable for the process application for which they will be used. 
1910.119(1)(6)(ii) 
Appropriate checks and inspections shall be performed to assure that equipment is installed 
properly and consistent with design specifications and the manufacturer's instructions. 
1910.119(j)(6)(iii) 
The employer shall assure that maintenance materials, spare parts and equipment are suitable for 
the process application for which they will be used. 
1910.119(k) 
Hot work permit. 
1910.119(k)(1) 
The employer shall issue a hot work permit for hot work operations conducted on or near a 
covered process. 
-. 1910-119(k)(2) 1910.119(k)(2) 
The permit shall document that the fire prevention and protection requirements in 29 CFR 
1910.252(a) have been implemented prior to beginning the hot work operations; it shall indicate 
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the date(s) authorized for hot work; and identify the object on which hot work is to be performed. 
The permit shall be kept on file until completion of the hot work operations. 
1910.119(1)(4) 
If a change covered by this paragraph results in a change in the process safety information 
required by paragraph (d) of this section, such information shall be updated accordingly. 
1910.119(1)(5) 
If a change covered by this paragraph results in a change in the operating procedures or practices 
required by paragraph (f) of this section, such procedures or practices shall be updated 
accordingly. 
1910.119(n) 
Emergency planning and response. The employer shall establish and implement an emergency 
action plan for the entire plant in accordance with the provisions of 29 CFR 1910.38. In addition, 
the emergency action plan shall include procedures for handling small releases. Employers 
covered under this standard may also be subject to the hazardous waste and emergency response 




Employers shall make all information necessary to comply with the section available to those 
persons responsible for compiling the process safety information (required by paragraph (d) of 
this section), those assisting in the development of the process hazard analysis (required by 
paragraph (e) of this section), those responsible for developing the operating procedures 
(required by paragraph (f) of this section), and those involved in incident investigations (required 
by paragraph (m) of this section), emergency planning and response (paragraph (n) of this 
section) and compliance audits (paragraph (o) of this section) without regard to possible trade 
secret status of such information. 
1910.119(p)(2) 
Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude the employer from requiring the persons to whom the 
information is made available under paragraph (p)(1) of this section to enter into confidentiality 
agreements not to disclose the information as set forth in 29 CFR 1910.1200. 
1910.119(p)(3) 
Subject to the rules and procedures set forth in 29 CFR 1910.1200(i)(1) through 
1910.1200(i)(12), employees and their designated representatives shall have access to trade 
secret information contained within the process hazard analysis and other documents required to 
be developed by this standard. 
[57 FR 23060, June 1,1992; 61 FR 9227, March 7,1996] 
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